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Abstract
We consider the optimal factor income taxation in a standard R&D
model with technical change represented by an increase in the variety
of intermediate goods. Redistributing the tax burden from labour to
capital will increase the employment rate in equilibrium. This has
opposite e⁄ects on two distortions in the model, one due to monopoly
power, the second to the incomplete appropriability of the bene￿ts
of inventions. Their relative momentum determines the sign of the
welfare e⁄ect. We show that, for parameter values consistent with
available estimates, taxing capital more heavily than labour can be
welfare increasing.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines how the tax burden should be distributed between capital
income and labor income in a basic R&D model of endogenous growth. The
standard optimal taxation results in a dynamic setting would imply that not
taxing capital income is e¢ cient although it may not be desirable due to equity
considerations. In this paper we show that in contrast to this conventional view,
taxing labor income more heavily than capital income may also be ine¢ cient.
The key feature of this economy driving this result is that pro￿ts, from goods
produced monopolistically and whose costly invention is the engine of growth
in the model, are linearly increasing in employment.
￿Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome,
Italy. Email: alessandrapelloni@hotmail.com.
1The conclusion that in the long run, capital income should not be taxed was
￿rst reached in Chamley(1986) and Judd (1985), and shown to be robust to the
relaxation of a number of assumptions( see the overviews by Chari and Kehoe
1999 and Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe 1999). Jones et al.(1997) show that the
conclusion holds for human as well as physical capital.
The literature on endogenous growth tends to reinforce the message that
capital income should not be taxed, as doing so would have adverse e⁄ects on
the rate of growth which would compound over time( see the survey in Jones
and Manuelli 2005)
We adopt for our analysis a standard R&D model of horizontal innovation,
with an in￿nitely lived representative agent, originally proposed by Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991) and known as the "lab-equipment model". Given its ￿ exi-
bility and simplicity this model provides a tractable framework for analyzing a
wide array of issues in economic growth.1 Entrepreneurs spend a ￿xed cost in
order to develop new intermediate goods, over the production of which they then
enjoy eternal monopoly power. Output in the ￿nal goods production sector is
linear in the number of intermediate goods used so unbounded growth is possi-
ble. There are two ine¢ ciencies in the model, one stemming from market power
in the intermediate goods sector, one from the uncomplete appropriability of the
social gains from innovating. We extend this benchmark model by introducing
government spending and by explicitly analysing the decision to supply labour.
Our main results concern equilibrium dynamics under the assumption that the
government has no access to lump-sum taxes or public debt, holds constant the
fraction of GDP allocated to public expenditure, and balances the budget at all
times. The tax rates ( ie the labour income tax rate and interest income tax
rate in our model) must adjust endogenously. Our exercise therefore focuses on
the e⁄ects of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure. Shifting the tax burden
from capital to labour will increase employment and the productivity of each
di⁄erentiated product, whose demand is therefore increased. The production
of each intermediate will then be more pro￿table, and the distortion due to
monopoly power lower. In the model, savings ￿nance the increase in the va-
riety of products. This invention activity is more rewarding the greater their
prospective demand. So a higher employment increases coeteris paribus the re-
turn to saving and therefore linearly increases growth . However the increase
in the tax on capital discourages savings and growth, thus worsening the dy-
namic ine¢ ciency. A third distortion in the model is represented by goverment
expenditure, which is assumed to be a constant fraction of GDP and to have no
impact on consumers￿ utility or the productivity of the economy. Taxing both
labour and capital income reduces this distortion. For reasonable parameter
values the interplay between the various channels means that the optimal tax
on capital is not only positive but very sizable and often higher than that on
labour.
Studies based on R&D models similar to ours have generally found that
1See the excellent survey in Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a selection of the wide range
of applications of this model .
2taxing savings is detrimental to growth and welfare (e.g. Lin and Russo 1999
and 2002, Zeng and Zhang 2002). Zeng and Zhang (2007) study ￿scal issues
adopting our same speci￿cation of the horizontal innovation model but focus on
a di⁄erent issue, i.e. they compare the e⁄ects of subsidizing R&D investment to
the e⁄ects of subsidizing ￿nal output or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate
goods in terms of promoting growth. They consider distortionary taxation (i.e.
taxes on labour income) but abstract from taxes on interest income.
This paper aims instead at further exploring the circumstances under which
optimal factor taxation may involve a non-zero tax rate on capital income.
A way in which taxing capital can be good is when government spending in-
creases the marginal productivity of capital, as in Baier and Glomm (2001),
Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), Guo and Lansing (1999),
Turnovsky (1996, 2000), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), and Chen (2007). The
presence of an informal sector the income from which cannot be taxed or other
restrictions on the taxation of factors are also grounds for the positive taxation
of capital income (see Correia 1996 and Penalosa and Turnovsky 2005). Aiyagari
(1995), Chamley (2001), Ho and Wang, (2007), Hubbard and Judd (1986) and
Imrohoroglu (1998) have emphasized that if households face borrowing con-
straints and/or are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, so that
excessive savings arise then the optimal tax system will in general include a pos-
itive capital income tax. Asea and Turnovsky (1998) and Kenc (2004) ￿nd that
increasing the tax rate on capital income may increase growth in a stochastic en-
vironment. Conesa and Garriga (2003), Cremer et al. (2003), Hendricks (2003,
2004), Erosa and Gervais (2002), Song (2002), Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and
Yakita (2003) show that in life cycle / OLG models the optimal capital income
tax in general is di⁄erent from zero. Conesa et al. (2008) quantitatively charac-
terize the optimal capital income tax in an overlapping generations model with
idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and ￿nd the optimal capital income
tax rate is signi￿cantly positive at 36 percent. All these papers can be seen as
examples of the argument in Judd (1999) that it is the presence of constraints
(for the government or the individual) or suboptimal expenditure choices that
makes capital income taxation desirable. Hence, they are second-best results.
All these arguments in favor of a positive rate of capital taxation are unre-
lated to ours as we model a perfect foresight closed economy with in￿nite lived
agents no e⁄ect of government expenditures on the rate of return of private
factors and no human capital accumulation.
Two articles closer to our analysis are Pelloni and Waldmann (2000) and de
Hek (2006). In the ￿rst paper a simple learning by doing model a la Romer
(1986) is augmented by endogenous labour supply and it is shown that if the
equilibrium is indeterminate capital taxation can increase growth and welfare.
However, the scope of the result is limited because indeterminacy is only possible
with a very high intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the model. de Hek
(2006) studies the e⁄ects of taxation on long-run growth in a two-sector endoge-
nous growth model with physical capital as an input in the education sector and
leisure as an argument in the utility function. If only capital income is taxed
human capital accumulation will be encouraged and the long-run growth rate
3may be increased. In order to isolate the labour employment factor from these
considerations, in our model we do not introduce human capital accumulation.
In Zhang et al (2008) the government should tax net capital income more
heavily than labor income, however investment is subsidized at the same rate
at which net capital income is taxed. We do not allow such subsidy.
A complete assessment of the welfare e⁄ects of the tax program has to include
an analysis of its e⁄ect on the dynamic properties of the model. In fact it has
recently been shown that factor taxes can a⁄ect the stability properties.of the
dynamic equilibrium and this possibility has to be taken into consideration.
In particular, Ben-Gad(2003), Palivos et al. (2005), Raurich (2001) Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (1997), among others have shown that the introduction of taxes
and improductive government spending may make the equilibrium exhibit local
indeterminacy. We show that this is not the case in this model, which features
a unique unstable balanced growth
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the model is
presented, in section 3 the general equilibrium conditions of the model are de-
scribed, section 4 analyzes the labour supply e⁄ect, the growth e⁄ect and the
welfare e⁄ect of a capital income tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize
labour. Finally section 5 does numerical calculations to show that even if the
growth rate is decreased, such a tax can increase welfare for widely accepted es-
timates of the relevant parameters and derives the optimal tax rates for various
sets of parameters, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We assume that in the economy there is a continuum of length one of identical











where C is consumption and H labour. ￿ is rate of time discount 1/￿ > 0 is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The following conditions ensure non
satiation of consumption and leisure: ￿ > 0 and:
h(H) > 0 (2)
(1 ￿ ￿)h0(H) < 0. (3)
Strict concavity of instantaneous felicity imposes:
(1 ￿ ￿)h00(H) < 0 (4)
2As Zeng and Zhang (2007) note, normalizing the population to unity removes from the





￿ h02 > 0. (5)
The instantaneous budget constraint consumers face is given by:
_ F = r(1 ￿ ￿l
k)F + ￿n(1 ￿ ￿l
k)N + w(1 ￿ tw)H ￿ C. (6)
Households derive their income by loaning entrepreneurs their ￿nancial wealth
F (of which all have the same initial endowment), by pro￿ts ￿n(net of the
interest payments) of the N ￿rms and by supplying labour H to ￿rms, taking
the interest rate r and the wage rate w as given. Capital income is taxed at
the rate ￿l
k while labour income is taxed at the rate tw. Optimization at an
interior point implies that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and




w(1 ￿ tw)(￿ ￿ 1)
C
. (7)











= ￿ ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿l
k) (8)
where ￿ is the shadow value of wealth. Given a no Ponzi game condition the
transversality condition imposes:
lim
t!1￿F exp(￿￿t) = 0. (9)
2.2 Firms
In this economy there are a ￿nal goods sector and an intermediate goods sector.
The former is perfectly competitive, whereas the latter is monopolistic. R&D
activity leads to an expanding variety of intermediate goods. All patents have
an in￿nitely economic life, that is, we assume no obsolescence of any type of
intermediate goods.
The production function of ￿rm i in the ￿nal goods sector is given by:




where Y (i) is the amount of ￿nal goods produced and L(i) is labour used by ￿rm
i and x(i;j) is the quantity this ￿rm uses of the intermediate goods indexed by
j. For tractability both i and j are treated as continuous variables. We assume
0 < ￿ < 1. The ￿nal goods sector is competitive and we assume a continuum
of length one of identical ￿rms. We can then suppress the index i to avoid
notational clutter. Firms maximize pro￿ts given by




5where w is the wage rate and P(j) is the price of the intermediate good j. By








and labour demand by:




Since the ￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector are competitive and there are constant
returns to scale their pro￿ts are zero in equilibrium. In contrast the ￿rms which
produce intermediate goods with patent which they invent then earn monopoly
pro￿ts for ever. The cost of production of the intermediate good j, once it has
been invented, is given by one unit of the ￿nal good.
The present discounted value at time t of monopoly pro￿ts for ￿rm j, or in





(P(j) ￿ 1)x(j)e￿r(s;t)(s￿t)ds (14)
where r(s;t) is the average interest rate during the period of time from t to s.
The inventor of the jth intermediate good chooses P(j) to maximize (P(j) ￿
1)x(j) where x(j) is given by 12, so for each j, the equilibrium price is and
quantity are:










The price is higher than the marginal cost of producing good j, and the quantity
produced, x(j); is therefore lower than the socially optimal level. This is in
fact the ￿rst ine¢ ciency in the model, a straitforward consequence of market
power in the intermediate sector. Notice a higher labour supply implies a higher
quantity of each intermediate goods in equilibrium. So a tax program leading to
increasing L can increase welfare by reducing the ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic
conditions.






while plugging 17 in 13 we have:














6The cost of development of new products is ￿ and there is free entry in the
market for inventions. Intermediate goods ￿rms will push the price of a patent
to equate its cost. Here a second ine¢ ciency in the model appears, which is due
to an appropriability problem: only the discounted value pro￿ts as opposed to
all of social surplus originating from an invention, is taken into account when
deciding whether to pay for research. This means that the pace of invention
will be too low.










which allows us to interpret it from an asset pricing perspective. The return on
holding a blueprint, rV, is given by dividends ￿; plus the capital gains, ie the
change in its value V. Later we show that, in a growing economy, we must
have V=￿ in equilibrium at all times. But if V= ￿ at all times; 20, given 19,
implies that in equilibrium we will have:
r = C1L (21)





1￿￿(1￿￿). 3 Notice that the higher is labour supply the
higher is the interest rate. As the sales of each intermediate good and therefore
pro￿ts are increasing in labour supply, for their present discounted value to be
equal to the given cost of an invention, the interest rate will have to increase.
2.3 Government
We assume government consumption G equals a ￿xed fraction, g, of output:
G=gY. We rule out a market for government bonds and assume that the gov-
ernment runs a balanced budget. The revenue from income taxes is used for
￿nancing expenditures. In equilibrium:
r￿l
kF + twwL = gY (22)
where on the left-hand side we have in￿ ows and on the right-hand side we have
out￿ ows.
3 Market Equilibrium
In calculating the equilibrium in the ￿nal goods market, intermediate goods
used in production, xN; are subtracted from ￿nal production Y to obtain total
value added. All investment in the model is investment in research and devel-
opment of new intermediate goods ￿ _ N. The economy wide resource constraint
is therefore given by:
3It also means ￿n = 0
7Y ￿ xN = C + ￿ _ N + gY (23)
We are now ready for the following:
De￿nition 1 In a competitive equilibrium individual and aggregate variables
are the same and prices and quantities are consistent with the (private) ef-
￿ciency conditions for the households 6, 7, 8 and 9, the pro￿t maximization
conditions for ￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector, 12 and 13 (or 18), and for ￿rms
in the intermediate goods sector, 15 (or 16) and 21, with the government budget
constraint 22 and with the market clearing conditions for labour (H = L), for
wealth (F = V N), and for the ￿nal good, 23.
The following relationship between before-tax labour income and before-tax











In the appendix, we show that, if the economy is to grow at any time, V will
have to be equal to ￿ at all times. Given this from the de￿nition of equilibrium
we can now arrive at the following:
Proposition 2 The competitive equilibrium conditions in the model give rise









































Proof. See Appendix 1
If a balanced growth path (hence BGP) exists, variables grow at a constant
rate along this path, and in particular employment is constant at a value e L.
Given 26 we have:
8Proposition 3 The condition for the existence of a BGP equilibrium in this
model is that 26 has a ￿xed point e L between 0 and 1, implicitly de￿ned by
B(e L) = 0; consistent with the TVC and with a positive growth rate ￿ for capital
and consumption given by:
￿ =




Proof. From 61, in a BGP, ie when _ L = 0; C and N will grow at the same rate.
From 8 this is seen to be given by 29
Speci￿c restrictions on parameters ensuring existence of a BGP equilibrium
will be considered after introducing a speci￿c functional form for the function
h. However for the general case we can establish some interesting results on the
uniqueness and stability of the BGP, assuming existence.





















; BGP employment e L is the point
of intersection between the two curves m and f, both continuous and di⁄eren-
tiable. Below we will see that if ￿ > 1 or if ￿ < 1 and tw ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿),
B￿ (e L )>0, ie whenever the two curves intersect the m(L) curve crosses the f(L)
curve from below. But of course a continuous function cannot cross another
continuous function from below twice in a row. This establishes uniqueness
of equilibrium given its existence, under the restrictions ￿ > 1;or ￿ < 1 and
-tw ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1.
We say that the equilibrium is locally indeterminate when there is a con-
tinuum of equilibrium paths that converge to the same balanced growth path.
Agents can coordinate on any equilibrium within such a continuum of equilib-
ria. Each of these equilibria exhibits di⁄erent growth rates during the transi-
tion. Therefore, local indeterminacy of equilibria may explain divergences in
short-run growth rates among countries with similar fundamentals. Moreover,
sunspot equilibria may arise when the equilibrium exhibits indeterminacy and,
thus, economic instability may be induced by shocks that do not a⁄ect the
fundamentals.
In this model, the discussion of the stability of equilibrium is closely related
to that of uniquess.
A(L) is always strictly positive for all values of L, by the negative de￿niteness
condition of the hessian of the utility function 4, so the di⁄erential equation 26
is de￿ned for all values of L beween 0 and 1. To study the dynamic nature of
a ￿xed point of 26, i.e. of BGP labour supply, we have to sign d _ L(e L)=de L: If
this derivative is positive the ￿xed point e L is a repeller and the BGP is locally
determinate. If d _ L(e L)=de L is negative then e L is an attractor, ie there is local










A(~ L) (since B(~ L) = 0).
But as said above and proved below B(~ L) = 0 implies B0(~ L) > 0 if ￿ > 1;or if
￿ < 1 and tw ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿). So in these cases the equilibrium will be unique
and unstable and the economy will always be on the BGP.
9Proposition 4 If a BGP equilibrium de￿ned by B(~ L) = 0 exists, while either
￿ > 1, or ￿ < 1 and tw ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) are true, then B(~ L) > 0 ie the
BGP equilibrium is unique and locally determinate, so there is no transitional
dynamics to it.
Proof. See Appendix
As the necessary conditions for B￿ (L) negative require unrealistic parameters￿
values (in particular a very low ￿ or a very high tw);from now on we concentrate
on the case of a determinate and unique BGP equilibrium.
4 E⁄ects of Taxes
4.1 E⁄ect on labour
It is relatively simple to calculate the e⁄ect of taxes on employment in this
model because the wage rate does not vary with it. As said above equilibrium
labour supply can be expressed as the solution to B(~ L) = 0. The e⁄ect of
shifting the tax burden from labour to capital can be deduced by using the
total derivative of B(~ L) = 0 with respect to labour and the tax (￿l
k);keeping the












With B0(~ L) > 0, the case on which we focus, this derivative signs as the
numerator of the fraction. To sign this, in the appendix we show that the TVC




This is, in light of ??, the well known condition that consumption must be




> 0. We are therefore ready to state the following:
Proposition 5 An increase in the tax rate on capital income whose proceeds are
used to reduce the tax on labour income will increase employment in equilibrium
if and only if
￿(￿￿1)h
h0 > ~ L; given determinacy. This condition is always satis￿ed
if ￿ > 1.
If h￿ >0, ie ￿ > 1;UcL > 0;ie leisure and consumption are substitutes, so that
taxing capital making consumption more attractive makes leisure less attractive,
helping to o⁄set the labour-leisure distortion due to labour income taxation. We
also notice that the Frisch ( compensated) elasticity of substitution Ef;given our















h￿1h0 < 0;so this elasticity will be




h￿1h0j , ie, coeteris paribus, the higher is ￿:
4.2 E⁄ect on Growth































Not surprisingly the condition for the tax change to be growth increasing is
stricter than the condition for it to be employment increasing, because for
growth to increase we need the net interest rate to increase not just the gross
interest rate, which is a linear function of the employment rate. When ￿l
k > 0,
the condition for the policy to be growth increasing is that the elasticity of





is not only positive but bigger
than ￿l
k=(1 ￿ ￿l
k). In particular we have:
Proposition 6 An increase in the tax rate on capital income whose proceeds
are used to reduce the tax on labour income will increase growth in equilibrium,

































and, regardless of the level of tw;is









Intuitively, the negative e⁄ect of the tax on growth, for a given gross of tax
interest rate, will be lower the higher is ￿;through the Euler equation. Moreover,
as we have seen before, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is increasing in ￿;so
the tax will provoke a stronger positive e⁄ect on employment and the gross of
tax interest rate.
4.3 E⁄ect on Welfare
Given ￿, the BGP rate of growth, and e L the BGP labour supply, it is possible











11In Appendix 2 it is shown how to express V as a di⁄erentiable function of
￿l
k and ~ L (itself a function of ￿l
k). The e⁄ect on welfare of an increase in
the tax rate ￿l
k is then positive if dV
d￿l
k
is positive. To simplify calculations, we









but is easier to manipulate algebraically so we will
use it. We have:












@(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])
(1 ￿ ￿)@~ L
(35)
In Appendix 2 we also show the following:
@(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])
















h0 ~ L ￿ 1
(36)
and













Substituting 30, 36 and 37 in 35, we get:






































Notice the denominator is always positive by 1 + ￿￿l
k ￿
g
1￿￿ > 0 and 31 and
with B0(~ L) > 0. Hence we arrive at the following:
Proposition 7 If B0(~ L) > 0;ie if the BGP equilibrium is determinate, the suf-
￿cient and necessary condition for an increase in the tax rate on capital income
























Of course, if a value for ￿l
k exist such that for this value 39 holds as an equal-
ity, while it holds strictly for lower tax rates, 39 gives us an implicit expression
for the optimal tax rate, given the tax program.4
In the appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 8 If ￿ > 1, or 0 < ￿ < 1 and
(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L > 1
￿;it is possible for a
revenue neutral increase in the tax rate on capital income to increase welfare
while decreasing growth .
4This way of solving the Ramsey problem ie by chosing the instrumental variables ( here
the tax rates) by optimizing the indirect utility function, which is derived in the private agent￿ s
reaction from a decentralized economy is known as the dual formulation.
12This result goes against the widely held belief, that when growth is subopti-
mal, further decreasing it cannot possibly be a Pareto improvement, no matter
what static gains it could allow, as the growth e⁄ects compound over time.
However, in the next section we will show that this surprising ￿nding is more
than a theoretical possibility and that for speci￿cations of tastes and technology
parameters often used in calibration exercises it is possible for the tax program
to induce Pareto improvements but reduce growth. The example we o⁄er are
also useful for a better interpretation of the mechanisms at work in producing
the results.
4.4 A Parametric Example
We consider here the following class of functions for the disutility of labor:
h(L) = (1 ￿ L)1￿￿ (40)
where ￿ > 1 if ￿ > 1 or ￿ < 1 < ￿ + ￿ if 0 < ￿ < 1.
First we notice that by plugging 40 and its derivative in 26 with B(~ L) = 0
we obtain the following value for employment in equilibrium ( also using 30):
~ L =
￿





￿ (1 ￿ tw)
￿+￿￿2





To be more precise, ~ L as de￿ned in 41, will be equal to employment in a
BGP equilibrium if it is less than 1 and if it is consistent with positive growth
and with the TVC.
Proposition 9 Conditions for the existence of a determinate equilibrium with





















With ￿ > 1;these conditions are su¢ cient as well as necessary, and in fact the
￿rst, as well as the TVC, will always hold. With ￿ < 1 a further condition (









2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(43)
Finally, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy is:
tw < 1 ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿l
k)(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (￿ + ￿ ￿ 2)
(44)
Reverting all these inequalities we have necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
an indeterminate BGP equilibrium with positive growth.

















: Notice this is just the denominator of the fraction on the left-
hand side of 41. So under determinacy ie when B0(~ L) > 0 (which gives us 44);
this denominator is positive. Given B0(~ L) > 0; the ￿rst inequality in 42 must
hold for ~ L to respect its upper bound ie to be smaller than one, as can be easily
seen from 41. Notice this condition is always true for ￿ > 1:For positive growth
we also need the net interest rate to be bigger than the rate of time discount or
C1(1￿￿l
k)~ L > ￿ by 29:Just by using 41 when the denominator of the fraction in
41 is positive(ie under determinacy) this condition gives us the second inequality
in 42. Finally the TVC that ￿(1￿￿)￿￿ < 0 is always true for ￿ ￿ 0 with ￿ > 1:
With ￿ < 1;by using 29 to express ￿ in terms of and ~ L and using 41, assuming
determinacy, the TVC can be found to impose 43. The proof of the statement
on the indeterminate equilibrium is obtained proceding in a strictly analogous
way but noticing that the denominator of the fraction on the left-hand side of
41 is negative with indeterminacy.














2￿￿￿￿ ;so it is possible















2￿￿￿￿ so again the inverses of the
second inequality in 42 and of the inequality in 43 will not be inconsistent.




































while using 41 the e⁄ect of ￿l






































as we already now from the general case the e⁄ect on labour will be always
positive for ￿ > 1:

















(￿ + ￿ ￿ 2) ~ L
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ~ L)
￿ 0 (46)
To calculate the optimal asset income tax we plug in 46 the expression for
L given by 41 and we equate it to zero:5
5When 41 is true, 31 will be true as well, so we do not have to check that it is respected .
14h
(￿ ￿ 1)2(1 ￿ ￿l
k) +
￿







































The root of this non linear equation in ￿l
k gives us the optimal value of the tax,
for each six-tuple of parameters f￿;￿;g;￿;￿;C1g: For all the parameterizations
we consider, the expression is always decreasing in ￿l
k for 0 ￿ ￿l
k ￿ 1, so the
stationary point of the welfare function we thus ￿nd corresponds to a maximum.
4.4.1 Calibration
Now we use 47 to calculate the optimal tax rates for reasonable values of the
parameters.






k0 stands for the initial capital income tax rate. These values imply
values for ￿ (through 29), for tw (through 25), for ￿ (through 41 and using
C1 = r=L by 21). We then solve 47 for ￿l
k, given the values so obtained for
f￿;￿;g;￿;￿;C1g:
Our choices in feeding numbers to the model follow related studies of nu-
merical R&D models (e.g. Jones and Williams 2000, Strulik 2007 and Zeng and
Zhang 2007).
For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we follow a general consensus
for it to be close to 0.5 and therefore set ￿ = 2, as our benchmark ( see Hall
2009).
The time preference parameter ￿ is usually thought to belong to the interval
0.01-0.05. As Strulik (2007) we set the benchmark value at 0.02 and let it vary
from 0.01 to 0.03.
A range of values for labour supply are used in calibration exercises. For
example Jones et al. (2005) use ~ L = 0:17 while a value of 0.3 is often adopted.
In 2005 the average US worker used 21 percent (24 percent) of her (his) time
endowment to work.6 We choose 0.23 as our benchmark value and 0.17-0.3 as
our range for sensitivity analysis .
Coming to 1=￿, which is the price markup in our model, we choose for it
the range (1.1, 1.37) and take 1.2 as the benchmark. We thus follow Jones and
Williams (2000) who make the markup vary between 1.05 and 1.37, and Strulik
(2007) who ￿xes it at 1.27.
6Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, current Population Survey, March 2005. For
further discussion see chapter 2 of Borjas (2009).
7Jones and Willians note that in Romer (1990) the monopoly markup is equal to the
inverse of the capital share 1=￿. Empirically, this implies a gross markup (the ratio of price
to marginal cost) of approximately 3, sharply exceeding empirical estimates of 1.05 to 1.4. In
our model the capital share is ￿=(1 + ￿), so the trade o⁄ between matching income shares
and matching markups is less severe. Taking the data from the IMF￿ s World Economic
Outlook (April 2007) and the European Commission￿ s Employment in Europe (2007), in the
15The long-run growth rate, the values used in related researches include 1.25
percent (Jones and Williams 2000), 1.75 percent (Strulik 2007), and 3 percent
(Zeng and Zhang 2007): in what follows we check that the equilibrium growth
rate ￿ generated in our model falls within these bounds.
Again following Jones and Williams (2000), the benchmark for the steady-
state interest rate is set to 7.0 percent, which represents the average real return
on the stock market over the last century in the US, and let it vary between 4.0
percent and 10.0 percent.
Turnovsky (2000) uses 14 percent for the ratio of non productive government
expenditure to GDP while Gomez (2007) uses the government consumption to
GDP ratio at 13.9 percent. We set as benchmark for g the value 14 percent and
consider the interval (0.08,0.18) as a robustness check
Gouveia and Strauss(1994) estimate the parameter that best approximates
the average income tax rate under the actual US income tax system to be 0.258.
We then choose as our benchmark value for ￿l
k0 0.26 (also adopted by Conesa
et al. 2009).
Our choices and results as regards the baseline economy are summarized in
Table 1:
Table 1: Baseline Economy: Parameterization and Results.
Parameters and Steady State Variables Determined Value
Rate of Time Discount:￿ 0.02
Initial Labour: ~ L 0.23
Mark-up:1=￿ 1.2
Interest rate: r 0.07
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution: ￿ 2
Government Expenditure Ratio: g 0.14
Initial Capital Income Tax Rate: ￿l
k0 0.26
Parameters and Steady State Variables Implied
Labour Supply Parameter: ￿ 2.57
TFP Growth:￿ 0.0159
Initial Labour Income Tax Rate: tw0 0.623
Steady State Variables under Optimal Taxation Change
Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate: b ￿
l
k 0.453
Optimal Labour Income Tax Rate: ^ tw 0.462
Optimal Labour: ^ L 0.285
Optimal Growth: ^ ￿ 0.0137
￿W=W 0.98
With these parameters the capital income tax rate associated with maximum
utility b ￿
l
k is 45.32 percent while the labour income tax rate drops from 62.33
percent to 46.23 percent.
US capital share of income is 39.7% (2005), in EU-15 it is 41.2% (2006) (among which the
highjest is in Spain, at 45.5%). With markup 1:2, ￿=(1 + ￿) = 0:4545; with markup 1.37 it is
￿=(1 + ￿) = 0:42.
16This is striking because the tax rate on savings is not only positive but very
close in value to the tax rate on labour income.




so to check the
robustness of our result and to from a better picture of the e⁄ects at work. The
parameter-couple (r;￿) need vary in the same direction, i.e., higher interest rate
has to be accompanied by a higher time discount factor to generate a plausible
￿. Also tw0 has to change when ￿ changes, through 30. Finally a di⁄erent value
of ￿ is now implied by the baseline ~ L ( by 41), as we report in column 2.
Table 2: Alternative Parameterizations
￿ ￿ tw0 ￿W=W (%) b ￿
l
k ^ tw
r=0.05,￿=0.01 2.64 0.0135 0.623 9.03 0.439 0.474
r=0.12,￿=0.03 2.60 0.0294 0.623 9.50 0.448 0.467
~ L=0.17 3.29 0.0159 0.623 11.76 0.473 0.449
~ L=0.3 2.09 0.0159 0.623 7.70 0.434 0.479
1=￿=1.14 1.55 0.0159 0.912 58.51 0.555 0.654
1=￿=1.37 3.15 0.0159 0.329 - 0.251 0.335
￿=0.98 0.96 0.0324 0.623 0.001 0.268 0.616
￿=1.1 1.19 0.0289 0.623 0.17 0.310 0.582
￿=3 3.91 0.0106 0.623 23.71 0.504 0.405
In all cases but one the e⁄ect of raising the capital tax above the initial
rate is welfare increasing, though growth decreases. The only exception is when
1=￿=1.37, when the optimal tax rate on capital is 0.251. In order to check
that the parameter values for ￿ are reasonable, we calculate the corresponding
compensated elasticity of labour supply (or, the Frisch elasticity of labour sup-
ply, which is obtained by keeping constant the shadow value of wealth) and we
compare our results with the available estimates. With the speci￿cation of h in






￿￿1 1 ￿ L
L
so it is decreasing in ￿; increasing in ￿ and decreasing in L. Most of the values for
"F;implied by our calibrations, when the optimal tax structure is implemented
in our model are between 1 to 2, with 3.67 the highest (with ￿=0.95) and
1.09 the lowest (with ￿=4). In the benchmark parametric space, the Frisch
elasticity is 1.59 when the optimal tax structure is used. These values are
broadly consistent with recent estimates found in the literature, which range
from 0.5 to 3 or higher (see, for example, Domeij and FlodØn 2006; Imai and
Keane 2004; Prescott 2006, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009, Shimer 2008), even
if the micro-elasticities are much lower. Economy-wide permanent changes
in taxes are in fact more likely to be associated with large responses in labour
supply as they induce coordinated changes in work patterns, while frictions can
attenuate short-run margin elasticities substantially ( see Chetty et al. 2009).
8
8Alesina et al.(2005) talk about a social multiplyer in leisure
17In table 3 we report separately on results for di⁄erent values of g, with the
other parameters kept at their benchmark values: of course a higher level of
g, implies a higher level of tw0;through 30, and so if we want to keep initial L
constant ￿ has to vary as well.
Table 3: Varying g
g ￿ tw0 ^ ￿
l
k ^ tw ^ ￿ ^ L ￿W=W (%)
0.18 1.81 0.863 0.549 0.623 0.0192 0.425 43.69
0.16 2.26 0.743 0.507 0.537 0.0147 0.329 21.65
0.12 2.80 0.503 0.394 0.392 0.0139 0.259 3.67
0.10 2.98 0.383 0.332 0.324 0.0147 0.243 0.85
0.08 3.12 0.263 0.268 0.257 0.0158 0.231 0.008
4.5 Comparison between the market economy and the so-
cial planner￿ s economy
In this subsection we compare the social planner￿ s equilibrium with the market
equilibrium. Our main aim is to rule out that our result on welfare being
improved while the growth rate is reduced is due to the fact that the BGP
growth rate in the market economy is higher than the social optimum.
Variables keep the same meaning as in the market economy, but the index
s is used to show they characterize the social optimum. Let Xs ￿
R Ns
0 Xs(i)di,
where Xs(i) is the amount of each type of the intermediate goods in the social
planner￿ s economy and Xs is the total amount produced of such goods. Then

























where ￿ is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the social budget constraint.
The social planner decides on the optimal path of the control variable Ls, Cs,
and Xs(i), and that of the state variable Ns. The key optimality conditions are:

























































By using the equations 50, 53 and 55 and the fact that the investment I



































This is di⁄erent from the analogous condition 31 in the market equilibrium.
We exploit this di⁄erence to compare the steady state labor supply in the social
planner￿ s economy and that in the decentralized economy. Given our speci-





L , which is a strictly
decreasing function of L. But then ￿￿1
￿￿1
1￿Ls
Ls < 1 < ￿￿1
￿￿1
1￿L
L (by 31 and 57)
we deduce that the steady state labor supply in the social planner￿ s economy is
larger than in the market economy.
For optimal growth to be lower than initial growth in the market economy






￿)(1 ￿ ￿kl) > 1￿￿








1￿￿ :For realistic ￿
and g this would require a negative ￿kl:
194.5.1 Interpretation of results
We are now ready to further comment on our ￿ndings that given observed levels
of consumption government spending, a tax rate on capital as high as 26 percent,
should not only not be reduced to zero, but generally raised to reduce the tax
burden on labor.
In fact, in most of the cases we consider the optimal tax rate on assets is
generally (much) higher than 26 percent and in fact very often higher than the
optimal tax rate on labour. In particular ￿l
k is increasing in ￿; decreasing in L,
and decreasing in the mark up, while both tax rates are increasing in g, with
the tax rate on asset income higher than the one on labour income, but for very
high levels of g.
To interpret these results, consider that on ￿rst impact, the shift of the
tax burden from capital to labour does not in￿ uence the consumers￿disposable
income but increases the opportunity cost of leisure. Since the income e⁄ect is
zero, the increasing wage only has a substitution e⁄ect on leisure, which causes
labor supply to increase. Further, the increased labor supply induces a higher
demand for the intermediate goods. This in turn induces a higher demand for
investment in R&D so the interest rate will rise. But the after-tax interest rate
is still smaller than the interest rate in a no-tax economy. Since the BGP growth
rate is a monotonically increasing function of the after-tax interest rate, it also
decreases.
There is a positive spillover from labour in the economy, linked to the pres-
ence of market power by ￿rms. Firstly, increased labor supply causes a positive
spillover as it increases pro￿ts and the value of patents. The worker considers




1+￿ is the income
share of labor. The di⁄erence is a spillover. Notice the size of this spillover is
positively related with the value of ￿. This helps us to understand why the pro-
gram which increases equilibrium employment is particularly bene￿cial when ￿
is high. This spillover occurs because the price of intermediate goods is greater
than their marginal cost so increased demand for an intermediate good has a
￿rst order bene￿t for its inventor. Secondly, the introduction of a new inter-
mediate good causes increased welfare because it causes increased wages. The
inventor only considers the part of the contribution to production that goes to
capital (here income on patents). So the e⁄ect of an invention on the present
discounted value of income is the cost of inventing divided by the income share
of capital, that is
￿
￿
1+￿ . When the return to capital is decreased after the increase
in the capital income tax and the parallel decrease in the labour income tax,
the pace of invention of new patents will be slowed down. So this is a negative
spillover, worsening the dynamic ine¢ ciency in the model. The optimal tax
policy depends on the relative strength of the distortions.
The tax rate on capital will be higher the higher is the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply. As this elasticity is positively related to ￿; a higher value of ￿
makes the bene￿cial e⁄ects of taxing capital more likely.The Frisch elasticity
also depends negatively on ~ L ( and on ￿;which is however an implied parameter
20in our calibration so we do not comment on its e⁄ect): a smaller ~ L means that
a small decrease of the tax rate on labour income will cause labour supply to
increase much, thus making for a bigger reduction in the monopoly distortion
and a relatively less important worsening of the appropriability failure.
Moreover for a given e⁄ect of the tax program on the net interest rate, the
higher is ￿ the lower will be the e⁄ect on the growth rate and the less important
the worsening of the dynamic ine¢ ciency. A bigger ￿ means lower intertemporal
substitution elasticity of consumption, or that consumers weigh more the current
consumption (lower) than the future (higher) ones. So, when the instantaneous
consumption is increased along with employment this increment is given more
weight than the future loss in consumption.
Finally, with higher subjective discount rate ￿, although consumption will
grow at a lower rate with a higher tax on capital, this dynamic loss is discounted
more heavily and thus the overall welfare e⁄ect is more likely to be be positive.
5 Conclusions
This study adds value to the literature on non-zero optimal capital income tax-
ation. We show that raising taxes on savings above 26 percent and reducing
taxes on labour income correspondingly to ￿nance government expenditures, can
be welfare improving in a model of endogenous technological progress. This
can happen because in the model there are two ine¢ ciencies, one related to
the market power of ￿rms, the second related to the appropriability problem
related to the invention of new products. The tax program has opposite e⁄ects
on the two distortions. The increase in the interest income tax and correspond-
ing decrease in the labour income tax changes the opportunity cost of leisure
without any change to disposable income, so labour supply will increase due to
the substitution e⁄ect. Raising labour supply increases the quantity of goods
produced by monopolistic ￿rms so that the welfare cost of monopoly is reduced.
The after-tax interest rate is reduced and so the growth rate goes down, ie the
second distortion(which provokes an ine¢ ciently low rate of growth even before
the change in the tax structure) is worsened. We have shown that a positive
e⁄ect of capital income taxation is more likely the higher the elasticity of labour
supply, the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and
the lower the income share of labour.
Our result shows that the sign of the growth e⁄ect of a tax program is
not necessarily the same as that of the welfare e⁄ect and that they should be
analysed separatedly, even in models when growth is sub-optimal.
In future research we plan to explore the generality of the result along two
main directions: ie considering a richer tax structure, including consumption
taxes and considering a model of vertical rather than horizontal innovation.
Further developments would be considering home production and the depen-
dence of the marginal utility of leisure by its economy-wide average level.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1
6.1.1 Proof that V=￿ in a growing economy.
V>￿ is never possible because of the free entry assumption in the research
market. On the other hand if V<￿; no research would be done so that _ N = 0;and
from the economy-wide resource constraint we would have Y ￿xN = C+gY;or,
using 17 and 16,
C =
￿







Plugging this, together with 13, in 7, the equilibrium level of employment would





1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ g
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ tw)(￿ ￿ 1)
(59)
25so if this equation had a solution for L between 0 and 1, this solution would de-
￿ne the equilibrium level of employment in a growthless economy, Lng:Plugging
Lng in 58 and 19 the consumption level and the pro￿t level in this growthless
economy would also be given. With labour and consumption ￿xed over time,





















V > 0: So V will increase and, since ￿ and r will stay the same
, r- ￿
V will increase as well, ie
:
V
V will be increasing. This implies that in ￿nite
time V will get to ￿; but then
:
V
V > 0 will be no longer possible. It would
then become pro￿table to invest in inventions and growth would start. How-
ever this would require a jump in C and L (no longer dictated by 58 and 59)












Vo < 0 that is if r- ￿
V < 0;V would be decreasing
at an increasing rate, reaching the value 0 in ￿nite time. If that happened 20












Vo ; then Vo < ￿ would be the equilibrium price of
existing patents and the economy would never grow. 9 Summing up we can say
that in a growing economy we must have V=￿ at all times:
6.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the factor exhaustion condition that the wage bill plus total interest pay-
ments is equal to GNP, and the fact just established that growth requires V=￿;
we have Y ￿xN = wL+r￿N, while substituting for C using equation 7, given
























9With ￿xed labour supply, the non growth equilibrium is not feasible when the rate







￿ > ￿:However this is not necessarily the case with elastic labour supply.




















The ￿rst summarizes the equilibrium conditions without growth, as shown in the text,
while the second, to be derived later, must hold in a BGP equilibrium with positive growth.
In principle that both equations have a solution is a necessary condition for the possibility
of two equilibria, one with, one without growth. The study of this possibility is beyond the
scope of the paper, though, so we do not explore it further.






+ (h0=h ￿ h00=h0) _ L (61)
Plugging this expression for
_ C
C in 8 we obtain:
h
0
h _ L ￿ ￿ + r(1 ￿ ￿l
k)
￿




Finally if we substitute in 62 the expression for
_ N
N given by 60 we obtain:
_ L =


















h ￿ ￿(h0=h ￿ h00=h0)
and using 21 we get 26 in the text.
6.1.3 Proof of proposition 4


















+ ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿l
k
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Y;is con￿scated by the government, so that ￿l
k = 1 and
tw = 1. However this upper bound for g is not a maximum, because for any
economic activity to take place we need g = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ "g, for some real number
"g in (0,1 ￿ ￿2];as production will not happen with a con￿scatory tax rate on
labour income, while there will be no growth with a con￿scatory tax rate on
interest income. So growth requires ￿l
k = 1 ￿ "￿l
k, with "￿l
k 2 R;0 < "￿l
k ￿ 1
and tw = 1 ￿ "tw, with "tw 2 R+=0. From g = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ "g;from tw = 1 ￿ "tw
and from tw =
g
1￿￿ ￿ ￿￿l
k (by 25)we deduce: 0 ￿ ￿l







(1￿￿) > "tw > 0.
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￿￿























































if ￿ > 1 the last expression is always positive so indeterminacy never obtains.


































The condition 9 implies that the BGP rate of growth, ￿, is lower than r(1￿￿l
k).
60 gives us:






























































6.1.5 Tax e⁄ect on growth


















As we focus on the case B0(~ L) > 0;we need just the consider the sign of the
expression inside the square brackets. The expression can be written, using 63,
































































28To understand how the ￿rst inequality is obtained, notice the following. In
a growing economy ￿
:
N will be positive. From the resource constraint ￿
:
N =
Y ￿ xN ￿ C ￿ G;given Y ￿ xN = (1 ￿ ￿2)Y (by 16 and 17), substituting for
C its expression given by 7, after expressing the wage in terms of income by 13
and rearranging we get:
￿
:














using also 25. So ￿
:
N > 0 implies, given 1 + ￿￿l
k ￿
g











So the the ￿rst inequality in 64 comes just by using 65. The second inequality




























As this lower bound on ￿ is is a monotonically increasing function of ￿l
k;we can


















￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
.
By using 7, 21 and 25 we can write:
C(0) = ￿N(0)











Using 29 we have:
￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = r(1 ￿ ￿l
k) ￿ ￿,
while by using 60 to get an expression for ￿, we obtain, again using 21:
r(1 ￿ ￿l









































log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ]
1 ￿ ￿




































h0 ￿ ~ L
￿
.
From here we calculate:
@(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])































h0 ~ L ￿ 1
,
which is 36 in the text. We also have:



























which is 37 in the text. therefore:























































+ ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿l
k
￿





























































































> 0 and ￿ > 1, then by 33 we will have: ￿
￿
(￿￿1)h


















+" for some strictly positive number


















We know 1 + ￿￿l
k ￿
g






> 0 (by the ??).





< 0. But this would require
(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L < 1
￿ < 1, which by 31 we
know is impossible if ￿ > 1.
Similarly, for 0 < ￿ < 1, if
(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L > 1
￿, the welfare-improving condition is
also less stringent than the growth-enhancing condition.
31